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The Recognition of Prosecutorial
Obligations in an Era of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment
and Over-representation of
Aboriginal People in Prisons
Marie Manikis*

I. THE RISE OF MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES IN
CANADA AND THEIR DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Mandatory minimum sentences in Canada have multiplied over the
years and continue to rise.1 There are approximately 100 mandatory
minimum sentences available in Canada2 and many more to be proposed in
Parliament. This is a huge increase since the Supreme Court’s first decision
on the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences in 1987, where
only nine mandatory minimum sentences were included in legislation.
Mandatory minimum sentences have had detrimental effects on the
criminal justice process, including on the principle of proportionality at
sentencing, as well as the over-representation of Aboriginal people in
prisons. Indeed, it has contributed to the erosion of the principle of
proportionality3 of sentences by making it impossible for judges to fully
*
Faculty of Law, McGill University. I would like to thank Benjamin Berger and the
organizers of the 2014 Osgoode Hall Constitutional Cases Conference for providing an opportunity
to discuss this important issue. Many thanks to Palma Paciocco for previous discussions in this area,
as well as Lisa Kerr, Hamish Stewart, Patrick Healy and Suzan Fraser for their input on this panel.
1
R. v. Anderson, [2014] S.C.J. No. 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Anderson”].
2
Debra Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s Minimal Impact on Mandatory
Minimum Sentences” in B.L. Berger, J. Stribopoulos, eds. (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 149, at 149.
3
The importance of proportionate sentences has been recognized as a leading principle in
many jurisdictions, including Canada, England and Wales and the United States. According to this
principle, a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the level of
blameworthiness of the offender (see s. 718.1 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46). It is worth
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account for mitigating factors in cases where that would require judges to
go below these mandatory minimums. A section 12 Charter4 challenge
declaring the provision creating the mandatory minimum unconstitutional
would be an appropriate solution, but the courts have repeatedly
highlighted that the standard to meet for a provision that gives rise to cruel
and unusual punishment is one of gross disproportionality, which makes
this challenge very difficult.5
In a recent and very thoughtful piece written by Paciocco,6 the author
highlights the clear disconnect between the required proportionality
standard in sentencing as a principle of fundamental justice protected
under section 7, and the higher standard of gross disproportionality
required for section 12 challenges, including challenges of mandatory
minimum provisions. These disconnects will indeed affect the principle
of proportionality and give rise to constitutional inconsistencies by
maintaining a regime of disproportionate sentences due to the higher
standard required under section 12. Paciocco rightfully argues in favour
of a less stringent standard for the section 12 analysis that is closer to the
regular proportionality analysis protected under section 7.
In addition to eroding principles of sentencing as well as creating
constitutional inconsistencies, mandatory minimum regimes have also
given rise to legislative inconsistencies and contradictions with the
legislative provisions related to mitigating factors. Indeed, section 718.2(a)
mandates sentencing judges to take into consideration mitigating

noting that the Canadian concept of proportionality has been interpreted in a more flexible and openended fashion than its traditional definition by expanding the concept of mitigating factors to include
elements that are not directly linked to the gravity of the offence and the level of blameworthiness of
the offender in relation to the crime itself. For instance, it has been expanded to include elements
related to the offender’s background, despite its less evident connection to the offence. (See R. v.
Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”] with its analysis
in Philip Stenning & Julian V. Roberts, “Empty Promises: Parliament, The Supreme Court, and the
Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders” (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev. 137; R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13,
[2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”], as well as state abuses (see e.g., R. v.
Nasogaluak, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, 2010 1 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.).) This area of research on
proportionality merits further time and space and thus will be left for another day.
4
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
5
See R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morrisey,
[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.); R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15
[hereinafter “Nur”]. More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in Nur did not revise its stringent
standard in order to provide consistency with the standard required for proportionality as a principle
of fundamental justice under s. 7.
6
Palma Paciocco, “Proportionality, Discretion, and the Roles of Judges and Prosecutors at
Sentencing” (2014) 18 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 241.
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circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. With the presence
of mandatory minimums, judges lose their ability to weigh in these
factors in the event that including them in the quantum of the sentence
would result in a sentence that goes below the mandatory minimum.
A particular and greater cause for concern that will be addressed in this
article is the inconsistency between the mandatory nature of mandatory
minimum sentences of imprisonment and the legislative duty under section
718.2(e) that mandates sentencing judges to pay particular attention to the
unique background of Aboriginals during sentencing, in order to accurately
assess their level of blameworthiness in the context of proportionality and
consider alternatives to imprisonment. This duty was enacted to address
the national crisis of over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in Canada,
which continues to grow.7 For instance, in 2010-2011, while forming only
11.9 per cent of the overall population in Saskatchewan, Aboriginal
offenders represented 77.6 per cent of the prison population.8 In this same
period, in Manitoba, while Aboriginal people constituted 12.9 per cent of
the overall population, they nevertheless represented 69.1 per cent of the
prison population. In Ontario, Aboriginals form 1.8 per cent of the
population and 11.4 per cent of the prison population. Finally in Quebec,
while Aboriginal people form 1.3 per cent of the population, they represent
4.4 per cent of the prison population. It is worth noting that percentages of
Aboriginal offenders in custody may be even higher, since these statistics
exclude admissions to custody in which Aboriginal identity was unknown.
Indeed, section 718.2(e) requires judges to consider Aboriginal status
and take into account this relevant background as an element that can
diminish the level of blameworthiness of the offender and ultimately affect
the quantum and nature of the sentence. The Supreme Court in Gladue9
and more recently in Ipeelee10 has made clear that section 718.2(e) is a
remedial provision that mandates a different framework of analysis for

7
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “What We Have Learned: Principles of
Truth and Reconciliation” (Winnipeg: the Commission, 2015), at 110. This report highlighted that
nationally, by 2011-2012, 28 per cent of all admissions to sentenced custody were formed by
Aboriginal people, while they make up only 4 per cent of the Canadian adult population. The overincarceration of women is even more disproportionate: 43 per cent of admissions of women to
sentenced custody were Aboriginal.
8
Statistics Canada, “Aboriginal adult admissions to custody, by province and territory,
2010/2011”, Juristat (2012), online: Statcan.gc.ca <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/
article/11715/c-g/desc/desc07-eng.htm>.
9
Gladue, supra, note 3.
10
Ipeelee, supra, note 3.
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sentencing Aboriginal offenders, taking into account “the distinct situation
of Aboriginal peoples in Canada” including:
(1) the unique systemic or background factors which may have played
a part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the
courts; and
(2) the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be
appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or
her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.

Hence, this duty imparts upon sentencing judges a duty to consider
the offender’s background, particularly their Aboriginal status, prior to
sentencing. If in light of the offender’s background, his or her level of
blameworthiness is diminished, this background can be considered a
factor that will affect the sentence and as much as possible help to
consider alternative sanctions to imprisonment. As reiterated in Ipeelee,
“the Gladue approach does not amount to reverse discrimination but is,
rather, an acknowledgment that to achieve real equity, sometimes
different people must be treated differently”.11 In the event that this duty
is ignored, a party can appeal the sentence. This framework will be
referred to as the Gladue principle or framework throughout this article.
Despite this legislative duty, the presence of mandatory minimum
sentences does not allow for judges to find alternatives to incarceration or
go below the legislated minimum — effectively denying judges the ability
to adequately take into account specific background as a mitigating factor.
This remains a severe problem, since the impact of mandatory minimum
sentences on Aboriginal people in Canada has been particularly acute and
has been a direct cause for their over-representation in Canadian prisons.12
These provisions are in direct conflict with one another and therefore
cannot logically coexist within a coherent and principled sentencing

11

United States of America v. Leonard, [2012] O.J. No. 4366, at para. 52, 2012 ONCA 622
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 490 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Leonard”],
citing Ipeelee, supra, note 3, at para. 71.
12
For example, research has highlighted the severe impact of mandatory minimum
sentences on the problem of over-incarceration of Aboriginal people in prisons. See, e.g., Larry N.
Chartrand, “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 449; Ryan
Newell, “Making Matters Worse: The Safe Streets and Communities Act and the Ongoing Crisis of
Indigenous Over-Incarceration” (2013) 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 199. Further, based on similar findings,
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “Calls to action” (Winnipeg: the Commission,
2015), at 3 recommended in its recent report that amendments are brought to the Criminal Code to
allow trial judges, upon giving reasons, to depart from mandatory minimum sentences and
restrictions on the use of conditional sentences.
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regime. For these reasons, this article suggests that Gladue should be
expanded and also apply beyond sentencing judges to prosecutors.

II. MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO
PROSECUTORS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
A notable consequence of mandatory minimum sentences that is central
to the main argument of this article is the degree of power that they transfer
to prosecutors with regards to sentencing. Indeed, in many ways, while
judicial discretion is limited by mandatory minimum sentences, conversely,
prosecutors are placed in a position where they are given a wide and almost
unfettered discretion to trigger these mandatory minimums that can
ultimately affect the sentence. Prosecutors can trigger them in many ways,
including by charging crimes that carry those sentences, by refusing to
accept guilty pleas to lesser offences that do not carry mandatory
minimums, by electing to proceed by indictment (rather than by summary
proceedings) where that election entails a particular mandatory minimum,
or by sending appropriate notice of an intention to seek greater punishment
prior to any plea by reason of previous convictions.13 In light of this
particular context, defendants have been creative in trying to find ways to
have prosecutors take into account Aboriginal status and proportionality by
increasing oversight by the judiciary. As recently shown in Anderson,
constitutional arguments have been unsuccessful.
In the case of Anderson, Anderson, an Aboriginal person, was
charged with impaired driving under section 253 of the Criminal Code.
This provided the prosecutor with the discretion under section 255 to
trigger a mandatory minimum sentence in cases of previous convictions,
by notifying the accused of its intention to seek greater punishment prior
to any plea.14 The Crown filed the appropriate Notice to the accused of
its intention to seek a greater punishment by reason of the accused’s four
previous impaired driving convictions. This triggered a mandatory
minimum sentence of not less than 120 days’ imprisonment.
The Crown policy manual in Newfoundland and Labrador, to which
the prosecutor presumably referred to, directs Crown Attorneys to

13
See e.g., Anderson, supra, note 1. Mirko Bagaric, “Proportionality in Sentencing: its
Justification, Meaning and Role” (2000) 12 Current Issues Crim. Just. 143.
14
Criminal Code, ss. 255(1)(a)(iii) and 721(1).
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request greater punishment under section 255 except in certain cases.
It also states that prosecutors may exercise their discretion not to pursue
an enhanced penalty, if all the prior convictions occurred more than
five years before the current offence, as was the case for Anderson. The
policy then lists a list of factors for Crown to consider when making this
discretionary decision, but does not explicitly mention Aboriginal status.
In this situation, before sentencing, Anderson challenged section 255 and
section 727(1), arguing that Crown prosecutors were constitutionally
required under section 7 to consider the Aboriginal status of the accused
when making decisions that limit the sentencing options available to
judges, in this case in the context of a mandatory minimum. More
specifically, the argument highlighted that the principle of proportionality
of sentences was a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the
Charter and this principle also applied to prosecutors in a context where a
provision (in this case mandatory minimums) reduced the sentencing
options available to judges in the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders.15 The
Crown argued that there was no such obligation and that the terms “the
background and circumstances of the offender” included Aboriginal status.
The Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador accepted
Anderson’s argument and highlighted that in order to ensure compliance
with section 7, the Crown must in all cases, including those involving
non-Aboriginal offenders, provide justification for relying on the Notice.
Having determined that he was not bound by the mandatory minimum,
the judge sentenced Anderson to a 90-day intermittent sentence followed
by two years’ probation and a five-year driving prohibition.
Similarly, the Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s appeal and all
members of the Court held that where the Crown tenders the Notice at
the sentencing hearing without considering the accused’s Aboriginal
status, this renders the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair, leading
to a section 7 breach. Interestingly, the Court noted that there would not
be a breach of section 7 if the Crown’s policy manual regarding the
decision to tender the Notice included a specific direction to consider the
offender’s Aboriginal status. The fact that it referred to the “background
and circumstances of the offender” was not sufficient, and therefore the
lack of clear direction, coupled with the lack of explanation on the part of
15

Mr. Anderson also argued that the statutory scheme violated s. 15(1) of the Charter
because it deprived an Aboriginal person of the opportunity to argue for a non-custodial sentence in
an appropriate case. Although this argument was accepted by the Provincial Court of Newfoundland
and Labrador, it was not presented at the higher instances.
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the Crown for its decision to tender the Notice in this case, led the Court
to conclude that section 7 of the Charter had been breached.
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with these judgments. Despite
the real effect of mandatory minimum sentences transferring sentencing
powers to prosecutors, the Court made clear on the constitutional question
that prosecutors have no constitutional duty under section 7 of the Charter16
to consider Aboriginal status when making decisions that would trigger
mandatory minimum sentences and reduce judicial sentencing options.
First, it emphasized that the role of prosecutors is distinct from the
role of judges and that there is no legal basis to support their equating
roles in the sentencing process. To preserve the division of functions, it
made clear that “it is the judge’s responsibility, within the applicable
legal parameters, to craft a proportionate sentence. If a mandatory
minimum regime requires a judge to impose a disproportionate sentence,
the regime should be challenged.”17
Second, the Court found that the claim that prosecutors must consider
the Aboriginal status of the accused prior to making decisions that limit a
judge’s sentencing options does not meet the test that governs principles of
fundamental justice,18 more specifically the second requirement that
requires popular consensus that the principle is fundamental to the way in
which the legal system ought to fairly operate. It highlighted that
recognizing such a principle would instead be contrary to the longstanding and deeply rooted division of responsibility between the Crown
prosecutor and courts by expanding the scope of judicial review.
Rooting its decision in the division of responsibility between the
Crown prosecutors and judges, it is clear that the major concern behind
the Court’s decision is the resistance towards increasing judicial
oversight of prosecutorial decisions. Indeed, the Court concluded:
The principle advanced by the accused does not meet the second
requirement as it is contrary to a long-standing and deeply-rooted approach
to the division of responsibility between the Crown prosecutor and the
courts. It would greatly expand the scope of judicial review of discretionary

16

Charter, supra, note 4.
Anderson, supra, note 1, at para. 25 (emphasis in original).
18
This test was reiterated in R. v. B. (D.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)
which stated at para. 46 that in order to be recognized as a principle of fundamental justice, a
principle must (1) be a legal principle; (2) enjoy consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental
to the way in which the legal system ought to fairly operate and (3) be identified with sufficient
precision to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or
security of the person.
17
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decisions made by prosecutors and put at risk the adversarial nature of our
criminal justice system by inviting judicial oversight of the numerous
decisions that Crown prosecutors make on a daily basis.19

Having ruled on the constitutional question, it then concluded that the
decision to tender the Notice is part of the wide category of prosecutorial
discretion, which cannot be reviewed unless there is evidence of abuse of
process.

III. THE QUASI-ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CANADA
The conclusion in Anderson on the constitutional question is not
surprising considering the wider Canadian trend towards protecting
prosecutorial power and decision-making from judicial oversight.
Indeed, if the Court had recognized proportionality as a constitutional
principle of fundamental justice that applies to prosecutors, it would have
extended judicial oversight by allowing Charter challenges to various
ways by which prosecutors can trigger mandatory minimums. More
specifically, it would have required that prosecutors disclose the reasons
behind their decisions and consider the defendant’s Aboriginal status
prior to triggering a mandatory minimum. Judges would have been able
to oversee this prosecutorial decision to make sure it conformed to the
Charter and enabled appropriate remedies in case of breach. Further, a
lower standard of review would have been applicable than the abuse of
process doctrine.
The vast majority of prosecutorial decisions are part of what is
recognized as “prosecutorial discretion”. These decisions, which are not
considered to be governed by the Charter and are not considered as “tactics
or conduct before the court”, remain almost unfettered by the judiciary.20
19

Anderson, supra, note 1, headnote.
See R. v. Boucher, [1954] S.C.J. No. 54, 1955 S.C.R. 16, at 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Boucher”]; More recently, in Anderson, supra, note 1, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized
two forms of prosecutorial powers, namely exercises of prosecutorial discretion and tactics/conduct
before the court. Prosecutorial discretion, is defined as an expansive term that covers all “decisions
regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it”
(Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, at para. 47, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Krieger”]). Although not exhaustive, this includes a number of influential decisions,
including the decisions to prosecute a charge laid by the police, enter a stay of proceedings in private
and public prosecutions, accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge, withdraw from criminal proceedings
altogether and take control of a private prosecution. This also includes the decisions to enter into and
repudiate plea agreements as seen in R. v. Nixon, 2011 S.C.J. No. 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Nixon”] and can only be reviewed in exceptional circumstances where there is abuse of
20
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In common law jurisdictions, as a vestige of the principle of Crown
immunity and concepts such as “the King can do no wrong”, prosecutorial
discretion has historically been heavily protected from judicial oversight.
While some common law jurisdictions have recognized greater room for
oversight, Canada has largely managed to insulate prosecutorial decisions
from oversight with some exceptions, notably with the recognition of
Charter obligations.
Indeed, the Charter contributed to some additional judicial oversight in
areas of traditionally unfettered prosecutorial discretion — most notably in
the area of prosecutorial disclosure of evidence to the accused.21
Despite this opening, the Supreme Court has recently strengthened
its protection of prosecutorial discretion, confirming its largely insulated
function in the name of prosecutorial independence.22 This shielded
power enables prosecutors to make a number of decisions about the
course of proceedings without having to provide any explanation or
being routinely second-guessed — effectively isolating prosecutors from
review by any other body, unless the doctrine of abuse of process can be
successfully invoked, which remains a very difficult standard to meet.23
The standard of review required to show abuse of process in such cases

process. The category of “tactics or conduct before the court” includes “such decisions are governed
by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes once the Attorney General has
elected to enter into that forum” (Krieger, id., at para. 47). Hence, it relates to ensuring that the
machinery of the court functions in an orderly and effective manner.
21
See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).
22
In addition to Anderson, recent cases have also reaffirmed the tendency towards the
immunization of prosecutorial decisions by suggesting that the abuse of process doctrine should only
be found in very exceptional circumstances; see, e.g., Nixon, supra, note 20. Also, see the Court of
Appeal’s decision in R. v. Bérubé, [2012] B.C.J. No. 1705, 2012 BCCA 345 (B.C.C.A.), in which a
plea agreement between the Crown and defence was repudiated due to the prosecutor’s error, which
was prejudicial to the defendant, but was not considered to meet the necessary egregiousness
required for it to be considered an abuse of process. Further, even when an abuse of process by the
Crown is found, the remedies attached to this are limited. For instance, in R. v. Babos, [2014] S.C.J.
No. 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) the Court decided that a Crown who makes threats intended to
bully an accused into foregoing his or her right to trial was a betrayal of her role as a Crown,
reprehensible and unworthy of the dignity of her offices. Despite finding an abuse of process, the
majority found that the remedy of a stay of proceedings was not appropriate since the seriousness of
the misconduct needs to be weighed against the societal interest in having a trial.
23
See Boucher, supra, note 20; more recently, in Anderson, supra, note 1. The abuse of
process doctrine is available where there is evidence that the prosecutor’s conduct is egregious and
seriously compromises trial fairness or the integrity of the justice system. The burden of proof lies on
the accused to establish, on a balance of probabilities, a proper evidentiary foundation to proceed with
an abuse of process claim, before requiring the Crown to provide reasons justifying its decision. Hence,
where a claimant establishes a proper evidentiary foundation for an abuse of process claim, the
evidentiary burden may shift to the Crown, who will be obliged to provide explanations for its decision.

286

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

is very high and has generally only been met in a minority of cases.24
Indeed, abuse of process refers to conduct that is egregious and seriously
compromises trial fairness and/or the integrity of the system. Further,
more restrictions were announced in Anderson in terms of evidentiary
burdens. In addition to the long-established onus on the accused to prove
an abuse on a balance of probabilities, Stuart deplores the fact that even
less transparency is required, since “the defence now also has an
evidentiary burden to meet before the Crown has to give reasons for the
exercise of its discretion”25 when it alleges an abuse of power.
Hence, since there is a trend towards isolating prosecutorial decisions
and ensuring that they remain one of the least transparent and most
unfettered powers in this country, it is no surprise that the recognition of a
prosecutorial obligation that would have opened the door to more judicial
oversight of prosecutorial decisions was rejected.
Interestingly, however, in the recent case of Nur,26 the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada does not explicitly disagree with the minority’s
conception of abuse of discretion even though it highlights that it remains
a notoriously high bar. Justice Moldaver’s minority judgment highlighted
that the abuse of process doctrine should not be exceptional. It made clear
that “[a]buse of process is typically characterized by intentional
misconduct or bad faith”,27 but cites Babos28 to suggest that situations may
arise where the integrity of the justice system can be affected in the
absence of misconduct. This includes situations where a prosecutor
decides to proceed by indictment in order to use the threat of a mandatory
minimum to extort a guilty plea, as well as situations where Crown
election was influenced by discriminatory factors such as the race of the
offender.29 This recent decision might suggest more openness to changing
the rigid definition of “abuse of process” in order to facilitate prosecutorial
accountability, if not under section 12, perhaps under section 7. Despite

24
See, e.g., Krieger, supra, note 20; Nixon, supra, note 20; R. v. Power, [1994] S.C.J. No. 29,
1994 1 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.). These cases include generally situations where there has been a
“flagrant impropriety” (Krieger, id., at para. 49); the prosecutor acted “dishonestly”, in “bad faith”,
“undermines the integrity of the judicial process”; for an “improper purpose” or with a lack of
“objectivity”; or the misconduct amounted to an “abuse of process”.
25
Don Stuart, “Anderson: Continuing a Questionable March to Legal Immunity for Crown
Attorneys” (2014) 11 C.R. (7th) 26.
26
Supra, note 5.
27
Id., para. 164.
28
Supra, note 22.
29
Nur, supra, note 5, at paras. 168-169.
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this noteworthy decision, it remains unclear whether courts will generally
continue to recognize abuse of process in situations where there is
intentional misconduct or bad faith.

IV. THE RATIONALES OF GLADUE AS A STAND-ALONE PRINCIPLE
THAT EXPANDS TO PROSECUTORS
Following Anderson, can prosecutors ignore proportionality and
Aboriginal status when their decisions limit sentencing options by
triggering mandatory minimums? In Anderson, the Court found that there
was no constitutional duty that imparts on prosecutors to consider
proportionality and Aboriginal status, but did not explicitly address
whether another type of duty may exist. The following section argues
that prosecutors should have, at minimum, an ethical duty to consider
Aboriginal status in light of Gladue as an arguably stand-alone principle
that should also apply to prosecutors. Failing to respect this principle
should be treated as an abuse of process, as defined in Nur that would
give rise to adequate remedies.
Further, it rejects Paciocco’s contention that the principle of
proportionality in sentencing necessarily comprises the Gladue principle.
Instead, it suggests that the consideration of Aboriginal status and
contextual background, known as the Gladue principle, is different from
the principle of proportionality, since its primary objective is to tackle
systemic discrimination against Aboriginal people and their overrepresentation in Canadian prisons.
Despite this view, this piece partially relies on Paciocco’s argument
that prosecutors must consider Aboriginal status in their decisions, as
part of their role as “ministers of justice”. This argument however, is
based on the Gladue rationale rather than the theory of proportionality at
sentencing. Indeed, it argues that even if Gladue and the theory of
proportionality were not recognized as constitutional duties that apply to
prosecutors, prosecutors nevertheless have an ethical duty to consider
Aboriginal status when triggering mandatory minimum sentences.
Hence, it outlines how the role of prosecutors as ministers of justice fits
with the consideration of Aboriginal background in light of the national
crisis of Aboriginal over-incarceration.
In this respect, all decision-makers that can affect the liberty interests
of Aboriginal people should consider Gladue principles, particularly
prosecutors, considering their impact on these interests, as well as their
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historical contribution to the over-representation of Aboriginal people in
prisons.
Finally, having examined the different prosecutorial guidelines, this
section argues that the current Canadian context is unsatisfactory, since
Aboriginal background is generally not explicitly accounted for in these
guidelines. It argues in favour of the recognition of such explicit duties in
prosecutorial guidelines and reflects on the enforcement of these duties by
proposing a possible remedial mechanism that can respond to ethical
breaches without resorting to additional judicial oversight of prosecutorial
decisions, while increasing transparency and promoting understanding of
prosecutorial decisions.
1. The Distinction between the Gladue Principle and the Principle
of Proportionality
As highlighted above, in order to reject the recognition of a
constitutional duty for prosecutors to consider proportionality that includes
consideration of Aboriginal status, the Supreme Court emphasized the
distinctive functional roles between the judiciary and prosecutors, mainly
to avoid judicial oversight. More specifically, it highlighted that
proportionality and consideration of Aboriginal background was associated
with the sentencing function which is a function performed by judges and
not prosecutors.
This stringent dichotomy related to the division of functions was
criticized by Paciocco, who argued that if proportionality is to be taken
seriously, Aboriginal background, which is part of proportionality, should
not only be the exclusive responsibility of sentencing judges, but also
applicable to prosecutors.30
Contrary to Paciocco’s claim, the Supreme Court rightfully decided
that prosecutors and judges have separate duties and that judges are the
ones who are responsible for applying the principle of proportionality as
part of their sentencing function. Indeed, the principle of proportionality
that Anderson referred to is a principle that has been traditionally
recognized in sentencing theory and practice, and has therefore been
associated with that specific stage of the process implemented by judges.31
30

Paciocco, supra, note 6.
See s. 718.1 Criminal Code; Mirko Bagaric, “Proportionality in Sentencing: its Justification,
Meaning and Role” (2000) 12 Current Issues Crim. Just. 143; Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth,
Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
31
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Proportionality is imbedded in notions of fairness and posits that the
severity of the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence
and to the level of blameworthiness of the offender. Since it is part of the
sentencing process, judges are the ones responsible of the implementation
of this principle even if its exact definition and breadth may vary between
the different common law jurisdictions.32
In Canada, elements of Gladue have been considered as a component
of the principle of proportionality in sentencing, but it would be an error to
equate Gladue to proportionality. Indeed, as highlighted earlier, it was made
clear in Ipeelee that Aboriginal background can indeed affect a person’s
level of moral blameworthiness and for this reason can effectively be
considered as a mitigating factor within the proportionality framework.33
However, the offender’s level of blameworthiness is merely one component
of proportionality34 as well as the Gladue principle. Indeed, the Gladue
principle’s rationale goes beyond merely considering the level of
blameworthiness of the offender in sentencing, and actually serves a wider
remedial purpose of reducing the overall Aboriginal prison population by
recognizing the historical and current systemic discriminatory practices by
state agencies against Aboriginal people that continue to plague the criminal
justice process. In order to reach this important remedial objective,35 it will
be shown below that this principle needs to be expanded beyond sentencing
and recognized as a stand-alone principle that also applies to all decisionmaking processes by criminal justice agencies that have the power to
restrict an Aboriginal person’s liberty.
Consequently, instead of relying on the theory of proportionality to
argue in favour of considering Aboriginal background and status, it would
have been more principled to argue Anderson in light of Gladue as a wider
stand-alone principle that should apply to all actors of the criminal justice
process, including prosecutors, when their actions and decisions limit the
liberty interests of Aboriginal people. The next section argues in favour of

32
Marie Manikis, “Decalibrating the scales of justice: prosecutorial discretion and mandatory
sentences” (Criminal law conference, University of Ottawa, May 1, 2015); Further, in Canada, its
application to the judiciary has been recognized as a principle of fundamental justice in several
noteworthy decisions, including Ipeelee, supra, note 3, at para. 36; Anderson, supra, note 1, at para. 21.
33
Ipeelee, id., at paras. 37-39, 73.
34
In addition to the offender’s level of blameworthiness the gravity of the offence,
measured by the level of harm is the other essential component of proportionality.
35
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “Calls to action” (Winnipeg: the
Commission, 2015), at 3.
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this expansion and suggests that if the rationales of Gladue and Ipeelee are
to be taken seriously, this framework should also be taken into account by
prosecutors as part of their role as ministers of justice when making
decisions that can impact on the liberty of Aboriginal people, including the
triggering of mandatory minimum sentences.
2. Expanding Gladue beyond Sentencing
The national crisis of Aboriginal over-representation in Canada is in
great part due to several actors in the justice process, and therefore special
consideration to the unique circumstances and background of Aboriginal
offenders should be taken into account by all the responsible agencies that
have an impact on over-incarceration, which, as will be seen below,
includes prosecutors. Adopting a mutually exclusive practice that only
applies the Gladue framework to sentencing judges, would exacerbate the
problem of Aboriginal over-representation and be contrary to the way in
which our legal system ought to fairly operate. Since the overrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders in prison is a systemic reality that
involves the responsibility of different agencies, it makes sense that the
ethos of Gladue should apply to all actors of the criminal justice system
that may contribute to the over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders.36
Further, in the wake of Gladue, Turpel-Lafond J. had also argued that if the
analytical framework of Gladue were to have the desired effect, Crown
counsel, defence counsel as well as the judiciary would all need to “adjust
their practice to reflect the requirements of the decision”.37 This shared
commitment seems fundamental to the way in which the legal system
ought to fairly operate.
Indeed, the Court in Gladue adequately highlighted that the duty to take
into account the status of Aboriginal offenders is not only a requirement that
applies to sentencing judges, but also to all decision-makers who have the
power to influence the treatment of Aboriginal people in the justice system.
In order to support this shared commitment and responsibility towards these
principles, the Court referred to the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba,
which commissioned a great deal of research on the criminal justice system

36

Stenning & Roberts, supra, note 3.
M.E. Turpel-Lafond, “Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural
Implications of R. v. Gladue” (1999) 43:1 Crim. L.Q. 34, at 37.
37
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and Aboriginals, and found that Aboriginal over-representation in prison is
attributable to a series of decisions by different actors of the criminal justice
system. It noted:
Aboriginal over-representation is the end point of a series of decisions
made by those with decision-making power in the justice system. An
examination of each of these decisions suggests that the way that
decisions are made within the justice system discriminates against
Aboriginal people in virtually every point. 38

In this respect, if the focus is merely on the sentencing process,
Gladue’s aims and ethos will not be met. A widespread procedural
adaptation would be needed that applies to all actors in the criminal justice
system that can have an impact on the Aboriginal person’s freedoms, and
this should be reflected in ethical duties and guideline manuals.
Recently, in line with this rationale, the Court of Appeal of Ontario in
Leonard,39 where leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court,
illustrated a broader application of Gladue in a context where the
Minister of Justice is given wide ministerial discretion. In this case, the
Minister of Justice signed separate extradition surrender orders for two
Aboriginal offenders for them to face trial in the United States on drug
charges, where their Aboriginal background will not be taken into
account in sentencing, and the mandatory minimums for the crimes
committed would have been drastically longer than the sentences they
would have faced in Canada. These individuals suffered from
disadvantaged backgrounds caused by Canada’s history of discrimination
and neglect in relation to Aboriginal people, including their membership
to families that were survivors of the residential school system. As well,
both came from homes where addictions of both drugs and alcohol were
present from a very young age. The issue in this case was whether the
Minister erred in law by failing to adequately consider the defendants’
Aboriginal status with respect to the Gladue principles when
surrendering the defendants. It was decided that surrender in this case
would be “unjust or oppressive” under section 44 of the Extradition Act40

38
Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People. The
Justice System and Aboriginal People: Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vol. 1
(Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991) [hereinafter “Manitoba Inquiry”], chapter 4. See online:
<http://www.ajic.mb.ca/volumel/chapter4.html>.
39
Supra, note 11.
40
S.C. 1999, c. 18.
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and would “shock the conscience” under section 7 of the Charter. In this
respect, the Court in Leonard made clear that Gladue principles not only
apply to sentencing judges but also towards a multitude of situations
where Aboriginal people generally “interact with the justice system”,
including when a Minister of Justice exercises discretion and must
consider the severity of the sentence the accused is likely to receive in
each jurisdiction.41 Finally, it reminded that the Gladue factors are not
limited to criminal sentencing by judges, but need to be considered by all
“decision-makers who have the power to influence the treatment of
aboriginal offenders in the criminal justice system”,42 as well as
whenever an Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and
related proceedings.
Based on this rationale, it will be seen in greater depth below that
prosecutors should also apply the Gladue framework since they are
decision-makers who have the power to influence the treatment of
Aboriginal offenders and can indeed contribute to their over-incarceration
when making important decisions. Further, it will be seen below that this
role also ties in with their role as ministers of justice.
3. The Consideration of Aboriginal Status as Part of the Role of
Prosecutors as “Ministers of Justice”
In common law jurisdictions, prosecutors have an important role to
play as “ministers of justice” with a duty to ensure that the criminal justice
system operates fairly towards all participants, including the accused,
victims of crime and the public. Indeed, prosecutorial decisions should be
made independently without any external pressure or influences, in an
objective way — devoid of passions, emotions or prejudices — and with a
lack of animus towards the suspect or the accused.
Although prosecutors are part of an adversarial system and need to
remain strong and effective advocates for the prosecution,43 as ministers
of justice they must also perform a special function in ensuring that

41
In this respect “Gladue clearly has a bearing on the question of the severity of the
sentence the accused is likely to receive in each jurisdiction. Any reasonable evaluation of the
severity of the likely sentence in each jurisdiction must take into account the possible effect of
Gladue” (Leonard, id., note 11, at para. 84).
42
Gladue, supra, note 3, at para. 65.
43
R. v. Cook, [1997] S.C.J. No. 22, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1113 (S.C.C.).
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justice is served, and for this reason cannot adopt a purely adversarial
role towards the defence. The role of Crown counsel as advocates has
historically been characterized as more a part of the court than an
ordinary advocate, and therefore the Crown’s actions should be fair,
dispassionate, and open to the possibility of the innocence of the accused
while avoiding “tunnel vision”.44
It has been highlighted numerous times in Canadian case law that the
complex role of the prosecutor is not to win or lose, nor is it to seek the
highest sentence possible — or indeed to pursue convictions, but rather
to ensure that justice is done.45
Crown counsel also have a responsibility to ensure that every
prosecution is carried out in a manner consistent with the public interest.
An aspect of this duty that needs to be highlighted is the leadership role
that Crown counsel has, as a key participant in the criminal justice
system, to work towards overcoming any forms of discrimination and
ensuring that the various forms of discrimination are not reflected in the
criminal justice system.
As part of this role, prosecutors have an important role to play in
remedying the national crisis of Aboriginal over-representation in
Canadian prisons that is a result of systemic discriminatory practices at
different stages of the criminal justice process, not merely sentencing. For
these reasons, prosecutors should pay particular attention to Aboriginal
background and thus apply the principles developed in Gladue.
Further, research has shown that prosecutors have also contributed to
the systemic problem of Aboriginal over-representation in Canadian
prisons. For instance, the aforementioned Manitoba Inquiry found that in
a similar context, Aboriginal accused are more likely to be charged with
multiple offences than are non-Aboriginal accused. It further concluded
that “the over-representation of Aboriginal people occurs at virtually
every step of the judicial process, from the charging of individuals to
their sentencing.”46

44
The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, The Hon. Fred Kaufman,
Commissioner (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1998), at 1136.
45
Boucher, supra, note 20.
46
Manitoba Inquiry, supra, note 38, ch. 4, the over-representation of Aboriginal people
occurs at virtually every step of the judicial process, from the charging of individuals to their
sentencing.
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Similarly, the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr,
Prosecution concluded that:
Donald Marshall, Jr’s status as a Native contributed to the miscarriage of
justice that has plagued him since 1971. We believe that certain persons
within the system would have been more rigorous in their duties, more
careful, or more conscious of fairness if Marshall had been white.47

Some scholars have even argued that the issue of over-representation
is not attributable to sentencing judges, but rather the result of prior
decisions taken by other criminal justice agencies — including prosecutors
and police — and therefore creative remedial solutions should be taken
within those agencies.48
Indeed, the need to exercise prosecutorial duties with greater rigour,
care and consciousness in the context of Aboriginal people should be
implemented by ensuring that special consideration of Aboriginal status
should expand to prosecutors. Considering that their actions and decisions
heavily influence sentencing options and outcomes, particularly when
triggering mandatory minimums, and have indeed directly contributed to
Aboriginal over-representation in prisons, ethical duties in relation to
Aboriginal offenders should be made explicitly clear as a reminder for
prosecutors. Further, in many of their decisions, they are called upon to
consider the “public interest”, notably by considering factors that relate to
the offender’s background. In this context, the consideration of Aboriginal
status and background in prosecutorial decision-making should explicitly
be included as an additional reminder of the importance of this shared
responsibility towards reducing discriminatory practices that have resulted
in the over-representation of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons.
Finally, failure to pay special attention to Aboriginal status should
arguably be considered an abuse of process as defined by Moldaver J. in
Nur, regardless of whether this failure is intentional or not. Indeed, as seen
in Nur and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Anderson, Crown
decisions, including Crown elections, motivated by prejudice against
Aboriginal persons would certainly meet the standard of abuse of process
by the Crown. A parallel can be made between this statement and the
failure to apply the Gladue framework in prosecutorial decisions. Indeed,
the failure to take into account the history and background of Aboriginal
47

Nova Scotia, The Marshall Inquiry: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr,
Prosecution, Digest of Findings and Recommendations 1989 (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia,
1989), at 162.
48
Stenning & Roberts, supra, note 3.
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people would contribute to further decontextualized and discriminatory
practices, as well as imprisonment, which is arguably prejudicial to
Aboriginal persons and thus would be considered an abuse of process by
the Crown that would compromise trial fairness and/or the integrity of the
justice system.
In brief, since prosecutorial decisions, particularly in the context of
mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment, can have an important
impact on the ultimate sentencing outcome, it would be important for
prosecutors to bear in mind their responsibility towards making their
decisions as fair as possible by including guidance found within the Gladue
framework. Indeed, their role fits well within the Gladue framework, which
finds roots in the concepts of equality, fairness and restraint. Based on
this account, it would also fall within the purview of prosecutors to
consider elements within the framework of Gladue, including moral
blameworthiness, but also the historical and contextual background of
Aboriginal people, as well as the context of systemic discrimination and its
effect on moral blameworthiness of these individuals.

V. A PRELIMINARY WAY FORWARD: THE RECOGNITION OF
ETHICAL DUTIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY AS PART OF
PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES
1. Prosecutorial Guidelines and the Need for Reform
The current state of ethical duties that imparts on prosecutors to
consider Aboriginal status is arguably unsatisfactory. Prosecutorial
guidelines available in each province and at the federal level were
analyzed to determine the extent to which Aboriginal status of defendants
should have been taken into account during prosecutorial decisionmaking. The guidelines revealed that in general, there are no explicit
requirements for prosecutors to consider the Aboriginal status of
defendants for most decisions. Ontario and Nova Scotia remain the
exception by indicating that prosecutors should consider the unique and
systemic or background factors that may have contributed to an
Aboriginal person’s criminal conduct, as well as relevant sanctions.49

49
Ministry of the Attorney General, Crown Policy Manual (Toronto: Government of
Ontario, 2005); Nova Scotia has a separate administrative policy for Aboriginal cases which ensures
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A partial recognition that remains insufficient can be found in some
guidelines in which prosecutors are directed to consider Aboriginal status
for very specific types of offences, namely for sentencing impaired
driving50 or domestic violence cases.51 A notable feature that is worth
mentioning is that most provinces in the Prairies, where the issue of
Aboriginal over-representation in prisons is the most acute, Aboriginal
status is either rarely mentioned or not mentioned at all.52 Further, some
provinces refer to other mentioned criteria, such as the accused’s
background,53 but as highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Anderson, an
explicit directive should be included that instructs prosecutors to
specifically take into account the offender’s Aboriginal status.54 A general
reference to background, or state, without explicitly referring to Aboriginal
background is vague and remains insufficient. Due to the unique status of
Aboriginal offenders, clear and explicit instructions need to be drafted.
Finally, it is well worth mentioning that Quebec fails to mention Aboriginal
status as a relevant factor to consider for any prosecutorial decisions.
In addition to the fact that explicit mention of Aboriginal background
consideration is generally lacking, there are also considerable
inconsistencies and variations between the different provinces, which adds
to the unsatisfactory state of ethical duties within the national scene. In light
of the reality of Aboriginal over-representation in prisons and the partial role
that prosecutors have played in this reality, it would be in the public interest
to have generally uniform prosecution policies applicable across the country.
2. A Possible Road towards Greater Transparency and
Accountability
Paciocco highlighted that one of the issues with ethical duties is that
they are difficult to enforce and do not necessarily entail remedies for
that the appropriate level of prosecutor expertise in Aboriginal issues is met, and has established an
Aboriginal Law Working Group.
50
Department of Justice, Federal Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa:
Government of Canada, 2014) [hereinafter “Federal guideline”].
51
The Federal guideline, as well as prosecutorial guidelines in Prince Edward Island and in
Newfoundland and Labrador, only refer to the status of Aboriginals for cases of domestic violence.
52
For instance, the Manitoba Prosecution Policies only refer to Aboriginal status in
decisions to use extra-judicial measures in a particular case; in Saskatchewan, there are no references
to a person’s Aboriginal status.
53
These provinces include Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Prince
Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador.
54
This argument was interestingly addressed by the Court of Appeal of Ontario in Anderson.
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individuals who are affected by ethical breaches.55 Indeed, the lack of
remedies traditionally associated with ethical duties is one of the reasons
complainants may be tempted to have some of their interests recognized
as legally enforceable rights. A possible way forward that does not
involve expansive judicial oversight may be found in the experience of
other common law jurisdictions that have elaborated administrative
processes for reviewing certain prosecutorial decisions.
A notable and recent example can be found in England and Wales
where a right to review has been recognized for victims of crime who
may want to challenge prosecutorial decisions, including the decision not
to prosecute and the decision to stop a prosecution. Indeed, in 2011, the
Court of Appeal in Killick56 recognized the right of a victim to seek a
review of a Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) decision not to
prosecute. In light of this judgment, the CPS launched guidelines for the
Victims’ Rights to Review Scheme which makes it possible for victims to
seek a review of a CPS decision not to bring charges or to terminate all
proceedings.57 This mechanism has recently recognized that victims can
also play a crucial role in ensuring that prosecutorial decisions are
explained and are also reviewed in cases of error.
First, this mechanism requires prosecutors to explicitly motivate their
decisions to complainants. This act of transparency seems like a greater way
to increase public confidence without interfering with prosecutorial
independence. Indeed, as recommended by Justice Rosenberg a few years
ago, in order to increase legitimacy and understanding of the process,
prosecutorial decisions should be supported as much as possible with
explicit explanations of the rationales behind their decisions.58 This process
does not disturb prosecutorial safeguards since it does not involve judicial
oversight and enables greater transparency and understanding of
prosecutorial decision-making by requiring prosecutors to provide interested
parties with motives and explanations for reaching a specific decision.
Second, and more controversially, this mechanism enables
complainants to seek review of specific prosecutorial decisions. This
right to review recognizes that during prosecutorial decision-making,
55

Paciocco, supra, note 6.
R. v. Killick, [2011] EWCA Crim. 1608 (C.A.).
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The Crown Prosecution Service, United Kingdom Government, “Victims’ Right to
Review Scheme” (2014), online: Crown Prosecution Service <http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_
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on the Twenty-First Century” (2009) 43 Queen’s L.J. 813.
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errors can occur. In this respect, interested parties can seek to obtain an
entirely fresh examination of all the evidence and circumstances of a
case, and if an error was made, the mistake will be redressed. The
mechanism involves a two-tiered process within the Crown Prosecution
Service that starts with (1) a local resolution process where the
prosecutorial decision is reviewed by a prosecutor who has not been
involved with the case. This stage will normally be completed within
10 days of receipt of the request for review and in the event where the
complainant remains dissatisfied, (2) the “independent review” will take
place, which comprises a reconsideration of the evidence and public
interest element by a reviewing prosecutor independent of the original
decision, who will look at the case afresh and determine whether it was
wrong. This second step should take no longer than 30 working days.
Regardless of outcomes, clear and detailed explanations of the decision
are offered to the complainant.
This new mechanism aims at making the process more accountable by
recognizing that public confidence in the system requires transparency and
admission of possible errors or abuses of process. Accessibility is a key
element to this process and does not require any formal legal action or
legal costs, and is also meant to be quick.
Arguably, for cases where errors occur, this process can be
considered a step forward from the Canadian status quo, where decisions
are partially explained and hardly reviewable due to the high standard of
abuse of process. Further, the current Canadian review process for abuse
of process remains costly, which is less so the case for the administrative
mechanism in England and Wales.
Another issue with the administrative review mechanism in England
and Wales is its loosely defined standard of review. By adopting a standard
of correctness, where mere error can be reviewed, it may arguably give rise
to the fears expressed by the Court in Anderson, namely, opening the
process to day-to day review of prosecutorial decisions.
A compromise between this mechanism and the process available
prior to Nur, where abuse of process was exceptional, would be to adopt
a standard of review based on reasonableness, where procedural
encroachment by prosecutors that would meet the definition of abuse of
process as defined by Moldaver J., in Nur could be reviewed.
Such a model can be adopted in Canada for prosecutorial decisions
that limit freedoms of Aboriginal people, such as the triggering of
mandatory minimum sentences that reduce sentencing options for
Aboriginal offenders. This new model of internal review would be a way
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to ensure that prosecutors take into account the unique circumstances and
background of Aboriginal offenders by ensuring that prosecutors have
taken note of this in their file and motivated their decision in this respect.
Review would only be possible in situations where prosecutors have
failed to engage with the individual’s Aboriginal background and status —
in other words by failing to explicitly explain in the file, the ways in which
the Aboriginal person’s background has been relevant or not in reaching
the specific prosecutorial decision. This form of review would not be a
substantive review of the actual decision, but rather of the process itself to
ensure that prosecutors have explicitly taken into account that person’s
Aboriginal status and background and highlighted the ways that this has
impacted or not on their decision. Hence, reviews by interested parties
would only be possible in cases where prosecutors fail to discuss the
accused’s Aboriginal status and background in the file and the ways this
status has impacted on their prosecutorial decision. This form of review
would limit and control the number of reviews and draw prosecutorial
attention to Aboriginal status and background without opening the door to
substantive reviews. It would also enable transparency and understanding
by facilitating communication by prosecutors of the rationales behind their
prosecutorial decisions.

VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, while there are numerous discussions about the role of
judges in dealing with mandatory minimums, there is less discussion on
the role and ethical duties that Crown prosecutors should have in a context
of decision-making, which can restrict individual liberty and exacerbate
the over-incarceration of Aboriginal people, including the triggering of
mandatory minimum sentences. This article provides a first step towards
this reflection. As highlighted by several reports, and more recently by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, the plight of Aboriginal
over-representation in prisons continues to plague the Canadian criminal
justice process and to address this situation, all actors of the criminal
justice process need to recognize their share of responsibility for this
history of discrimination, including prosecutors. Following this
recognition, a way forward would be to expand the Gladue principle to all
actors in the criminal justice process who can limit Aboriginal people’s
freedoms and contribute to their over-representation in Canadian prisons.
To achieve these goals, several changes can be made in prosecutorial
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guidelines to explicitly highlight that prosecutors need to pay special
consideration to Aboriginal people before making decisions that would
affect their liberty and find alternatives to imprisonment whenever
possible. Further, discussions around ways to increase transparency and
accountability while maintaining some limits to judicial oversight of
prosecutorial decisions should also be encouraged. Although this piece
specifically addresses the importance of considering Aboriginal status and
background in some prosecutorial decisions, there may be other decisionmaking contexts in which the Gladue principle should be expanded to
contribute to a more just and equal process, in light of the history of
systemic discrimination and abuse of process suffered by Aboriginal
people in the criminal justice system.

